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MULTIPLE PUNITIVE DAMAGE AWARDS
JERRYJ. PHILLIPS*
I. INTRODUCTION
T he United States Supreme Court has upheld punitive damage
awards against constitutional attacks based on the Excessive
Fines Provision of the Eighth Amendment and on the Due Process
Clause.' In its most recent punitive damage case, TXO Production
* W. P. -Toms Professor of Law, University of Tennessee.
1. See, e.g., TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2711
(1993). In TXO, the Supreme Court upheld a punitive damage award far exceed-
ing the actual award against a Due Process Clause attack. Id. at 2724. The award
was upheld even though a majority of the Court found that punitive damage
awards must satisfy due process, with a plurality emphasizing the constitutional
requirements of fairness and reasonableness. Id. at 2718-28. For a further discus-
sion of the facts and holding of TXO, see infra notes 2-5 and accompanying text.
Prior to the TXO decision, the two controlling cases on the constitutionality of
punitive damage awards were Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S.
1 (1991) and Browning-Ferris Industries of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc.,
492 U.S. 257 (1989). These two cases, however, failed to provide a workable frame-
work and afforded little guidance with which to analyze punitive damage awards.
See, e.g., Sheila L. Birnbaum & J. Russell Jackson, Since TXO, State Courts are Relying
on Grounds Other Than Federal Due Process to Limit or Modify Punitive Damage Schemes,
NAT'L L.J., Mar. 14, 1994, at B4, B6. In Haslip, the Court upheld, against a Due
Process Clause attack, a punitive damage award of one million dollars that was four
times the amount of compensatory damages. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 23-24. The Court
determined that the jury's finding of intentional fraud and bad faith was reason-
able and, thus, due process was not violated by the punitive damage award. Id. at
15-18. The Court emphasized the importance of basing punitive damage awards
on objective criteria and ensuring that jury decisions undergo full procedural pro-
tection. Id. at 18-23. In Haslip, however, the members of the Court voiced a strong
concern that the 4 to 1 ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages may be
"close to the line" of constitutional unacceptability. Id. at 9, 36-42, 61-63 (Scalia &
Kennedy, JJ., concurring & O'Connor, J., dissenting). However, Justice Blackmun,
writing for the majority, found that because there was no constitutional bright line
for determining a reasonable punitive damage amount, reasonableness and ade-
quate guidelines would be considered primary factors in determining constitution-
ality. Id. at 18.
In Browning-Ferris, the Supreme Court upheld a punitive damage award
against attacks under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Browning-Ferris,
494 U.S. at 278. The majority found that the Excessive Fines provision of the
Eighth Amendment was not applicable to punitive damages in a civil case where
the claim of excessiveness under the Due Process Clause had not been raised. Id.
at 276-77. However, all nine justices expressed their concern with the constitution-
ality of large punitive damage awards. Id.
Attacks on punitive damages as violative of the Excessive Fines provision of the
Eighth Amendment have consistently been rejected by lower federal courts and
various state courts. See, e.g., Daugherty v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 85 F.R.D.
693 (N.D. Ga. 1980); Palmer v. A.H. Robins Co., 684 P.2d 187 (Colo. 1984) (en
(433)
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Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp.,2 the Court found that due process
was not violated by the imposition of a punitive damage award of
ten million dollars against an oil and gas company, even though the
award was 526 times greater than the actual damages. 3 Although
the Court recognized that due process places substantive limits on
banc); Unified Sch. Dist. No. 490, Butler County v. Celotex Corp., 629 P.2d 196
(Kan. Ct. App. 1981).
As early as 1852, the Supreme Court in Day v. Woodworth established that the
imposition of punitive damages did not violate the United States Constitution. 54
U.S. (13 How.) 363 (1852). See generally LINDA L. SCHLUETER & KENNETH R. RED-
DEN, PUNITrVE DAMAGES § 3.0-.13 (2d ed. 1990); Note, The Imposition of Punishment
&y Civil Courts: A Reappraisal of Punitive Damages, 41 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1158, 1177
(1966). Furthermore, in Louis Pizitz Dry Goods Co. v. Yeldell the Supreme Court
held that substantive due process was not violated by a punitive damage award.
274 U.S. 112, 115-16 (1927). The Court found that punitive damages were not
fundamentally unfair, so as to impair the defendant's substantive due process
rights. Id. The Court relied heavily on the proffered purpose behind an award of
punitive damages. Id. at 114-15. See also Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335
(1975) (defining factors critical for ensuring that punitive damage awards are not
violative of procedural due process). See generally Malcolm E. Wheeler, The Consti-
tutional Case for Reforming Punitive Damages Procedures, 69 VA. L. REv. 269, 273
(1983).
2. 113 S. Ct. 2711 (1993). In TXO, the dispute between TXO and Alliance
centered on an unfair business competition claim over an oil and gas lease. Id. at
2715-16. TXO had attempted to acquire oil and gas rights in a West Virginia par-
cel of land from Tug Fork Land Company. Id. at 2716. In an attempt to influence
the negotiations of the leases, TXO's counsel falsely contrived a "cloud on title" to
the tract. Id. TXO then sought a declaratory judgement to "clear title" and Alli-
ance and Tug Fork counterclaimed with a "slander of title" claim. Id. Evidence
was introduced that TXO had acted in bad faith in bringing a declaratory judg-
ment action. Id. Also, evidence of TXO's wealth and expected royalties were of-
fered to prove that TXO had engaged in similar nefarious conduct prior to this.
Id. at 2716-17. A jury awarded $19,000 in actual damages for Alliance's cost of
defense and $10 million in punitive damages based on evidence of TXO's mali-
ciousness and bad faith. Id. at 2717. The trial court dismissed TXO's motion for
remittitur and the Supreme Court of West Virginia upheld the award. Id. On
appeal, TXO averred that the award of punitive damages violated the Due Process
Clause as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Haslip, and in the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals' decision in Games v. Fleming Landfill, Inc., 413 S.E.2d
897 (1991). TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2717. The West Virginia Supreme Court of Ap-
peals, however, rejected TXO's claims and found that the jury decision was based
on TXO's proven malicious conduct and was warranted to send a message of deter-
rence to mid-level corporate managers. Id. at 2717-18.
3. TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2724. The decision was highly fragmented and contro-
versial, with Justice Stevens writing for the majority, Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and
Thomas concurring, and Justices White, O'Connor and Souter dissenting. Id. at
2713-14. Justice Stevens, joined by the Chief Justice and Justice Blackmun, held
that punitive damage awards are not so "grossly excessive" as to violate due process,
and the procedure for determining punitive damages was not so "unconstitution-
ally vague" as to violate the Due Process Clause. Id. The plurality recognized the
parties' desire to formulate a concrete "test;" however, it rejected both Alliance's
proposed rational basis standard and TXO's proposed heightened scrutiny stan-
dard. Id. at 2718-20. The plurality also acknowledged that the punitive damage
award was large, but it found that "in light of the millions of dollars potentially at
stake, TXO's bad faith, the fact that TXO's scheme was part of a larger pattern of
[Vol. 39: p. 433
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the amount of punitive damages, it found that there was no mathe-
matical bright-line with which to distinguish constitutionally accept-
able awards from constitutionally unacceptable awards.4 Rather,
the Court emphasized the reasonableness of the award and the
existence of procedural safeguards as key factors in its constitu-
tional calculus.5 The TXO decision, thus, seems to lay to rest fed-
eral constitutional concerns about punitive damage awards based
fraud, trickery and deceit, and TXO's wealth, the award [could] not be said to be
beyond the power of the State to allow." Id. at 2721-23.
4. Id. at 2721-23. Justice Stevens, joined by the Chief Justice and Justices
Blackmun and Kennedy, concluded that TXO was afforded procedural due pro-
cess. Id. In doing so, they rejected TXO's arguments that: (1) the jury received
improper jury instructions regarding punitive damage, (2) there had been inade-
quate trial and appellate review of punitive damages and (3) it had no advance
notice of the possibility that the jury could award such substantial punitive dam-
ages. Id. at 2723-24.
Justice Kennedy, in his concurrence, disagreed with the plurality's "reasona-
bleness standard," finding that the standard did not adequately compare the pun-
ishment with the actual conduct that gave rise to the punitive damage award. Id. at
2724 (Kennedy, J., concurring). As an alternative, Justice Kennedy proffered a
standard that focused on the reasons for awarding such large punitive damage
awards, rather than on the actual amount of the award. Id. at 2724-25 (Kennedy,
J., concurring). Justice Kennedy reasoned that "[w) hen a punitive damages award
reflects bias, passion, or prejudice on the part of the jury, rather than a rational
concern for deterrence and retribution, the Constitution has been violated, no
matter what the absolute or relative size of the award." Id. at 2725 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring). Justice Kennedy agreed with the plurality's judgment, because he
found that the record as a whole reflected the fact that the jury had considered
TXO's intentional wrongful conduct and had shown concern for the general prin-
ciples of retribution and deterrence. Id. at 2726 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas found that there was no federal sub-
stantive due process right to a reasonable punitive damage award, although proce-
dural due process does require appellate review of awards for reasonableness. Id.
at 2726-27 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Accordingly, they reasoned that TXO's due pro-
cess challenge must fail, because the jury had been properly instructed on dam-
ages under West Virginia law, and the punitive damage award had received
adequate trial and appellate review. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Conversely, the dissenters argued that the punitive damage award's size and
the procedures that produced it were so excessive and vague as to directly violate
due process. Id. at 2728-42 (ScaliaJ., dissenting). They posited that the award was
oppressive and arbitrary and was not based on the principles of fair retribution
and deterrence. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
5. Id. at 2726. The majority stated that it did "not consider the dramatic dis-
parity between the actual damages and the punitive award controlling . . . [be-
cause] the jury may reasonably have determined that [TXO] set out on a malicious
and fraudulent course to win back ... the lucrative stream of royalties that it had
ceded to Alliance." Id. at 2722. Thus, the majority found that given TXO's bad
faith and malicious actions, the punitive damage award was not so "grossly exces-
sive" as to violate the Due Process Clause. Id. Similarly, Justice Kennedy, in his
concurring opinion, maintained that "it was rational for the jury to place great
weight on the evidence of TXO's deliberate, wrongful conduct in determining that
a substantial award was required in order to serve the goals of punishment and
deterrence." Id. at 2726 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
19941
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on insufficient guidelines and excessiveness. 6
The constitutionality of multiple punitive damage awards aris-
ing out of the same conduct, or same course of conduct, however, is
a major issue that the Supreme Court has not yet considered. The
issue has been considered by a number of lower courts, various
6. See Dunn v. HOVIC, 1 F.3d 1371, 1388, 1404 (3d Cir.) (relying on TXO and
Haslip decisions to determine whether punitive damage award was grossly exces-
sive), modified in part, 13 F.3d 58 (3d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Owens-Coming
Fiberglas Corp. v. Dunn, 114 S. Ct. 650 (1993). But see Colbert C. Stuart III, Note,
Mean, Stupid Defendants Jarring Our Constitutional Sensibilities: Due Process Limits on
Punitive Damages After TXO Production v. Alliance Resources, 30 CAL. W. L. REV.
313, 336-43 (1994) (discussing likely difficulty that lower courts will have applying
TXO reasonableness standard). See generally Michael J. Pepek, Note, TXO v. Alli-
ance: Due Process Limits and Introducing a Defendant's Wealth When Determining Puni-
tive Damages Awards, 25 PAC. L.J. 1191 (1994) (concluding that after TXO, state
courts will have to apply their own substantive and procedural tests when reviewing
punitive damage awards).
In Dunn, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that a
punitive damage award was supported by "clear and convincing evidence" and that
the award was justified and not "grossly excessive." Dunn, 1 F.3d at 1382-91. Spe-
cifically, the Third Circuit recognized that proper judicial review included such
factors as: (1) the reasonable relation between the award and the defendant's con-
duct; (2) the degree, duration, existence and frequency of the defendant's past
fraudulent acts; (3) the'wealth of the defendant; (4) the overall financial stability
of the defendant; (5) the cost of current and pending litigation; and (6) the exist-
ence of multiple damage awards for the same conduct. Id. at 1404. The Third
Circuit looked to the Supreme Court's emphasis in TXO upon the reasonableness
of punitive damages for determining constitutionality. Id. at 1380. In addition to
reasonableness considerations, the Third Circuit found that the existence and de-
gree of multiple punitive damage awards against a defendant and the possible ad-
verse effects of such punitive damage awards on pending claims were two critical
factors in mass tort litigation. Id. at 1384-87; see also Transportation Ins. Co. v.
Moreil, 879 S.W.2d 10 (Tex. 1994) (comparing due process procedures approved
by Supreme Court in Haslip, and reiterated in TXO, with Texas punitive damage
scheme and finding Texas scheme lacking). In Transportation Insurance Co. v.
Moreil, the Texas Supreme Court pointed out that both the Haslip and TXO deci-
sions placed great importance on three areas: (1) adequate jury instructions that
limited discretion; (2) detailed post verdict review by the trial court, including
explicit reasons for supporting the decision on the record; and (3) comprehensive
appellate review of the award. 879 S.W.2d 10, 27-28 (Tex. 1994); see also Honda
Motor Co. v. Oberg, 114 S. Ct. 2331 (1994) (striking Oregon constitutional amend-
ment prohibiting judicial review of punitive damage awards on federal due process
grounds). The Moreil court then introduced new procedures that Texas courts are
required to use to ensure fairness and predictability of awards. Moreil, 879 S.W.2d
at 29; cf. Georgia v. Mosely, 436 S.E.2d 632 (Ga. 1993) (upholding constitutionality
of Georgia statutory provision that requires awarding 75% of punitive damages to
state treasury and limiting punitive damage awards to only one plaintiff), cert. de-
nied, 114 S. Ct. 2101 (1994). Unlike the Moreil court, the Georgia Supreme Court
in Georgia v. Mosely did not rely on approaches defined in Haslip and TXO. 436
S.E.2d 632 (Ga. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2101 (1994). Instead, the Georgia
Supreme Court began with the premise that there is no constitutional right to
punitive damage awards. Id. at 640. Seegenerally Birnbaum &Jackson, supra note 1,
at B6 (addressing state and legislative approaches for ensuring fair punitive dam-
age awards rather than relying on Supreme Court's seemingly amorphous due pro-
cess jurisprudence).
[Vol. 39: p. 433
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state courts and the awards that have been upheld against constitu-
tional attack.7 Multiple punitive damage awards are generally chal-
lenged as violating the Due Process Clause by punishing defendants
repeatedly for essentially the same conduct.8 Defendants attack
multiple punitive damage awards under a theory similar to double
jeopardy analysis.9 Although multiple punitive damages awards
have not been held unconstitutional, they may be invalidated or
reduced on policy grounds. 10
This Article is based on the premise that there is no inherent
7. Dunn, 1 F.3d at 1385; see, e.g., Solly v. Manville Corp. Asbestos Disease Fund,
996 F.2d 1454 (6th Cir.) (construing federal due process and Ohio law), cert. de-
nied, 113 S. Ct. 411 (1992); Simpson v. Pittsburgh Corning Corp., 901 F.2d 277 (2d
Cir.) (construing federal due process), cert. dismissed, 497 U.S. 1057 (1990);Jack-
son v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 781 F.2d 394, 402-07 (5th Cir.) (construing Mis-
sissippi law), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1022 (1986); Hansen v. Johns-Manville Prods.
Corp., 734 F.2d 1036, 1041-42 (5th Cir. 1984) (construing Texas law);, cert. denied,
470 U.S. 1051 (1985) Palmer v. A.H. Robins Co., 684 P.2d 187, 215-16 (Colo. 1984)
(declining to strike punitive damages award); W.R. Grace & Co. v. Waters, 638 So.
2d 502 (Fla. 1994) (upholding multiple punitive damage awards in mass tort asbes-
tos litigation); Eagle-Picher Indus. v. Balbos, 604 A.2d 445, 472 (Md. 1992) (same);
Fischer v.Johns-Manville Corp., 512 A.2d 466, 475-80 (NJ. 1986) (same). See gener-
ally Richard A. Seltzer, Punitive Damage Awards in Mass Tort Litigation: Addressing the
Problems of Fairness, Efficiency and Control, 52 FoRDHAM L. REv. 37 (1983). The
Third Circuit in Dunn declined to strike a punitive damage award in an asbestos
action on a claim of unconstitutionally repetitive punishment for the same con-
duct. Dunn, 1 F.3d at 1385-86. The court held that the multiple punitive damage
awards would not be struck down because the defendant-asbestos manufacturer
failed to demonstrate that the amount it was required to pay in the aggregate of
prior awards had reached the maximum amount tolerable under the Due Process
Clause of the United States Constitution. Id. at 1385-87. In addition, the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts does not preclude successive punitive damage claims stem-
ming from the same conduct; rather, it states that the existence of multiple claims
is only a factor in determining constitutional limits to damage amounts. RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 cmt. e (1977).'
8. See Dunn, 1 F.3d at 1385-90. In Dunn, the, asbestos manufacturer, OCF,
sought to have the court find the punitive damage award repetitive and, therefore,
violative of due process. Id. at 1385., OCF argued that punitive damage awards had
reached the point of overkill in asbestos litigation and, thus, did not meet the goals
of deterrence and retribution. Id. The Third Circuit, however, rejected OCF's
claims and found no violation of the Due Process Clause. For federal and state
cases that reject Due Process Clause challenges to multiple punitive damage
awards, see supra note 7.
9. The "double jeopardy" theory is based on the principle that punitive dam-
ages serve the purpose of criminal sanctions. Because the first award of punitive
damages against a defendant is based on the full extent of the defendant's wrong-
ful conduct, any subsequent awards for the same wrongful conduct is analogous to
double jeopardy in a criminal case. See SCHLUETER & REDDEN, supra note 1, § 3.9.
The United States Supreme Court, however, has been unwilling to find that the
Fifth and Sixth Amendments are implicated by the imposition of multiple punitive
damage awards. Id. (citing Rex Trailer Co. v. United States ex rel. Marcus v. Huss,
317 U.S. 537 (1943)).
10. For a discussion of the invalidation or reduction of punitive damages see
infra notes 25-35 and accompanying text.
1994]
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due process problem arising out of multiple punitive damage
awards for the same course of conduct, because each of the claim-
ants has been separately injured and, therefore, each may justly
claim retribution from the defendant.1 This Article further ex-
plains how existing judicial procedures control the problem of po-
tential overkill to the extent that a punitive damage award
represents deterrence for reprehensible conduct by the defendant,
and other potential defendants, toward persons other than the
claimant.12 Finally, this Article concludes that there appears to be
no alternative judicial or statutory solution to multiple punitive
damage awards other than presently available bankruptcy
procedures.13
II. PUNITIVE DAMAGES CONSIDERED GENERICALLY
A. The Fallacy of Runaway Punitive Damage Awards
It is common practice to derogate punitive damage awards as
11. A punitive damages award is based on a fact-finder's determination of the
amount appropriate for the totality of the defendant's misconduct against the in-
jured plaintiff. See Dunn, I F.3d at 1389 (finding defendant failed to show that
aggregate of prior awards punished entire wrongdoing); Simpson, 901 F.2d at 281
(requiring that defendant demonstrate punitive damage award was adequate pun-
ishment). Individual awards are based on a jury's assessment of the wrongfulness
of a defendant's conduct at the time of the action and, therefore, serve as retribu-
tion for conduct against plaintiffs. See Dunn, 1 F.3d at 1386; see also Andrea G.
Nadel, Annotation, Propriety of Awarding Punitive Damages to Separate Plaintiffs Bring-
ing Successive Actions Arising Out of Common Incident or Circumstances Against Common
Defendant or Defendants ("One Bite" or "First Comer" Doctrine), 11 A.L.R.4th 1261, 1262
(1982 & Supp. 1992) (noting that courts "have generally held that no principle
exists which prohibits a plaintiff from recovering punitive damages against a de-
fendant or defendants simply because punitive damages have previously been
awarded.., for the same conduct, or because other actions are pending.., which
could result in an award of punitive damages").
12. The "overkill" argument is based on a defendant's claim that the volume
of pending claims against it is so great that the point of overkill has been reached
with respect to punitive damage awards. See Dunn, 1 F.3d at 1385. In addition, the
defendant argues that the magnitude of compensatory damage awards against it
adequately furthers the goals of deterrence and punishment. Id. The Third Cir-
cuit did not find this "overkill" argument compelling in Dunn, because the defend-
ant failed to prove that the prior damage awards reached a level that violated due
process. Id. at 1385-90; see, e.g., Simpson, 901 F.2d at 281; see also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 cmt. e (19 7 7 ). But see Alan Schulkin, Note, Mass Liability
and Punitive Damages Overkill 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1797 (1979).
13. See Dunn, I F.3d at 1386 (finding that no federal or state court can fashion
effective response to multiple punitive damages); see also Michael Rustad, In Defense
of Punitive Damages in Products Liability: Testing Tort Anecdotes with Empirical Data, 78
IOWA L. REv. 1 (1992) (arguing that tort reform of punitive damages is not neces-
sarily more successful). In Dunn, the Third Circuit recognized the validity of em-
pirical data indicating that legislative efforts to limit punitive damages are
insufficient to resolve the problems associated with punitive damages. Dunn, 1
F.3d at 1386. But see Seltzer, supra note 7, at 67-68.
438 [Vol. 39: p. 433
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being a windfall to claimants, because such awards are generally not
considered compensatory in nature. 14 However, this is not an accu-
rate description of such awards in a number ofjurisdictions where a
claimant's litigation costs, including attorney's fees, are treated as a
legitimate component of such awards. 15 Insofar as such costs are
treated as a part of a punitive damage award, the award is compen-
satory in nature. 16
There may also be other compensatory elements to a punitive
damage award.17 The award may specially compensate a claimant
for an affront done to her dignity and for the inconvenience and
hardship that are not normally redressed as a regular part of com-
14. The Restatement (Second) of Torts defines punitive damages as "dam-
ages, other than compensatory or nominal damages, awarded against a person to
punish him for his outrageous conduct and to deter him and others like him from
similar conduct in the future." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(1) (1977).
The primary purposes of punitive damages are retribution and deterrence for in-
tentionally malicious conduct of defendants. See SCHLUETER & REDDEN, supra note
1, at § 2.0. Punitive damages also serve to satisfy litigation expenses and redress
petty wrongs. Id. Punitive damages, however, are not favored in the law because
only limited procedural safeguards exist to control the imposition of these civil
damages. Id. § 2.1 (citing Alguire v. Walker, 506 N.E.2d 1334 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987)
and Costello v. Capital Cities Communications, Inc., 505 N.E.2d 701 (Ill. App. Ct.
1987), rev'd on other grounds, 532 N.E.2d 790 (Ill. 1988)). Due to this disfavor of
punitive damages, courts and legislatures find that there is no right to a punitive
damage award and, therefore, such awards may be limited. See generally 22 AM. JUR.
2D Damages § 740 (1988).
Critics of punitive damages contend that it is unjust to benefit plaintiffs be-
yond compensatory damages. See SCHLUETER & REDDEN, supra note 1, § 2.2(A) (2).
This criticism, however, is undermined by the principle that a defendant's mali-
cious conduct often warrants the imposition of a punishment in excess of mere
compensation of victims for their injuries.
15. See St. Luke Evangelical Lutheran Church, Inc. v. Smith, 568 A.2d 35 (Md.
1990) (finding that inclusion of reasonable attorney's fees in calculation of puni-
tive damage award is necessary to deter future wrongful conduct). An award of
attorney's fees is based on the punishment or "fee shifting" rationale in which an
award is used as a legislative or judicial tool to punish oppressive, malicious and
wrongful conduct. Id. at 39; see also Hall v. Cole, 93 S. Ct. 1943, 1946 (1973);
Markey v. Santangelo, 485 A.2d 1305 (Conn. 1985) (finding that punitive damages
serve to compensate for expenses of litigation); Umphrey v. Sprinkel, 682 P.2d
1247 (Idaho 1983) (determining that attorney's fees are relevant in calculating
punitive damages); Hofer v. Lavender, 679 S.W.2d 470 (Tex. 1984) (recognizing
that punitive damages compensate for inconvenience and for attorney's fees);
Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., The Legal Theory of Attorney Fee Shifting: A Critical Overview,
1982 DUKE LJ. 651, 660-61 (1982). But see International Elecs. Co. v. N.S.T. Metal
Prods. Co., 88 A.2d 40, 46 (Pa. 1952) (declining to consider attorney's fees in
calculation of punitive damages because attorney's fees are seen as compensatory
in nature and, thus, not proper in measuring of punitive damages).
16. See St. Luke, 568 A.2d at 39-43. See generally SCHLUETER & REDDEN, supra
note 1, §§ 2.0-3.13.
17. For a further discussion of the compensatory elements of a punitive dam-
age award, see infra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
1994]
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pensatory damages.' 8 Such damages should be considered com-
pensatory in nature, because they are designed to make the
claimant whole.19 These damages, as well as damages for other liti-
gation costs, are unique to the claimant and, as such, are not sub-
ject to attack as duplicate recoveries. 20
Much of the so-called "tort reform" attack on punitive damage
awards has been directed against alleged runaway punitive damage
awards. 21 However, responsible empirical research indicates that
there has never been a punitive damage award crisis in this coun-
try.22 The data shows, in contrast, that standard awards made in
this area are neither excessive in number nor in amount.23 More-
18. See Dunn v. HOVIC, 1 F.3d 1371, 1378 (3d Cir.), modified in part, 13 F.3d
58 (3d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Dunn, 114 S.
Ct. 650 (1993). In Dunn, the Third Circuit relied on the premise that punitive
damages need not be specifically related to the actual pecuniary or physical inju-
ries suffered by the plaintiff.. Id.; see also Hospital Auth. v. Jones, 409 S.E.2d 501,
503 (Ga. 1991) (finding punitive damages need not bear rational relationship to
actual damages), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1175 (1992); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 908 cmt. c (1977) (noting that while "the extent of the harm may be
considered in determining their amount, it is not essential to the recovery of puni-
tive damages that the plaintiff should have suffered any harm, either pecuniary or
physical").
19. See Dunn, I F.3d at 1381-83; TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp.,
113 S. Ct. 2711, 2720 (1993) (plurality opinion) (observing that punitive damage
"awards are the product of numerous, and sometimes intangible, factors; a jury
imposing a punitive damages award must make a qualitative assessment based on a
host of facts and circumstances unique to the particular case before it").
20. See Dunn, 1 F.3d at 1390; Simpson v. Pittsburgh Corning Corp., 901 F.2d
277 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 497 U.S. 1057 (1990); In re Northern Dist. of Cal.,
Dalkon Shield IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 1171 (1983).
21. See generally Lisa K. Gregory, Annotation, Plaintiff's Rights to Punitive or
Multiple Damages When Cause of Action Renders Both Available, 2 A.L.R.5th 449 (1992)
(collecting cases in which plaintiff's single cause of action may result in both puni-
tive and multiple punitive damage awards); Seltzer, supra note 7 at 55-61 (making
various proposals to contain punitive damages awards and prevent "overkill").
22. See Rustad, supra note 13, at 24 (arguing that empirical data disprove
skyrocketing of punitive damage awards); Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know Any-
thing About the Behavior of the Tort Litigation System-and Why Not?, 140 U. PA. L. REv.
1147 (1992) (analyzing existing punitive damages and current reforms and con-
cluding that existing punitive damage system is best); Stephen Daniels & Joanne
Martin, Myth and Reality in Punitive Damages, 75 MINN. L. REv. 1 (1990) (discussing
current criticisms of punitive damages and arguing that criticisms are unfounded
given reality of number and amount of actual punitive damage awards).
23. See Rustad, supra note 13, at 24; MARK A. PETERSON ET AL., PUNITIVE DAM-
AGES: EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 12 (1987)' (finding that proportion of cases in which
punitive damages were- awarded* was small and noting little increase in number of
such cases between 1960 and 1984); Daniels & Martin, supra note 22, at 41 (con-
cluding that "median punitive damage award is not at a level that is likely to 'bog-
gle the mind'"). Michael Rustad, in his article, identifies the most common
negative assumptions regarding punitive damages and disproves each using empir-
ical data. Rustad, supra note 13, at 36-85. For example, Rustad disproves the as-
[Vol. 39: p. 433
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over, most awards are, generally speaking, richly deserved given the
principles of retribution and deterrence that are furthered.2 4
B. The Insufficiency of Legislative Response
Contrary to empirical evidence, the legislatures of several states
have responded to a perceived crisis in the area of punitive dam-
ages by enacting statutory retrenchments on punitive damage
awards.25 Two of the more popular restrictions, which are dis-
cussed below, place caps on the amount and the number of puni-
tive damage awards that can be imposed upon one defendant from
the same course of conduct.26 Both types of restrictions, however,
are unwise.27
1. Cap on Amount of Punitive Damage Awards
An arbitrary punitive damage award cap in a given case defeats
the very purpose of punitive damages-to punish the defendant ac-
cording to his just desserts. 28 What is just, however,. depends upon
concepts such as: (1) the reprehensibility of the defendant's con-
duct toward the plaintiff as well as toward others; (2) the degree of
harm done; (3) the unjust enrichment to the defendant as a result
of such conduct and (4) the wealth of the defendant.2 9 These con-
sumption that punitive damage awards are often exorbitant by comparing the
median size of both actual and punitive damages in 1983. Id. at 46. His study
reveals that median punitive damage awards have remained proportionate to com-
pensatory awards. Id. at 45. Further, by charting the number of products liability
cases from 1965 to 1980, excluding asbestos cases, in which punitive damages were
awarded, Rustad disproves the assumption that punitive damages are skyrocketing.
Id. at 38. His study reveals that with the exception of asbestos cases, punitive dam-
age awards have actually decreased since the mid-1980s. Id. at 37.
24. See Cathey v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 776 F.2d 1565 (6th Cir. 1985)
(finding multiple damages not violative of due process because of redress neces-
sary for individual injuries suffered). See generally SCHLUETER & REDDEN, supra note
1, § 2.2(A) (discussing purpose of punitive damages as means of punishing wrong-
doers and deterring others).
25. See JERRY J. PHILLIPS, PRODUCTS LABILrrv § K, at 188-89 (4th ed. 1993)
(discussing states' legislative responses to unavailability and unaffordability of in-
surance coverage allegedly caused by increased quantity of litigation and escalating
verdict amounts).
26. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-11-21 (Supp. 1992) (limiting amount of punitive
damage awards); CoLo. REv. STAT. § 13-21-102 (Supp. 1991) (same); KAN. CIv.
PROC. CODE ANN. § 60-3701 (e)-(f) (Vernon Supp. 1992) (limiting number of puni-
tive damage awards for same course of conduct).
27. See 22 AM.JUR. 2D Damages § 733 (1988). (contending that restricting puni-
tive damage awards diminishes intended effects of punishment of wrongdoer and
deterrence of others).
28. See id.; SCHLUETER & REDDEN, supra note 1, § 2.2(A) (1) (stating that pur-
pose of punitive damage awards is to punish defendants for wrongdoing).
29. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 cmt. e (1977) (setting forth
1994]
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siderations vary according to the individual case; if they are not con-
sidered on a case by case basis, the whole purpose of a punitive
damage award will be subverted. 30
2. Cap on Number of Punitive Damage Awards
A facially attractive approach to the punitive damages problem
is to limit the number of times that punitive damage awards can be
imposed for the same course of conduct. 31 For example, Georgia
has limited such awards in products liability to only one award for a
given course of conduct and has placed a cap on the amount of the
punitive award in non-products liability cases.3 2
The Georgia approach is, however, singularly inappropriate.
As the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey in
Juzwin v. Amtorg Trading Corp.33 recognized, such a limitation can-
not run beyond a court's jurisdiction.3 4 If additional punitive dam-
factors that trier of fact can consider when determining amount of punitive dam-
age award).
30. See TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2711, 2720
(1993) (noting that determining amount of punitive damage awards is function of
jury to be accomplished through qualitative assessment of unique facts and circum-
stances of case).
31. See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 510.263(4) (Vernon Supp. 1992) (limiting
number of punitive damage awards for same course of conduct); Roginsky v. Rich-
ardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 839 (2d Cir. 1967) (Friendly, J.) (questioning
"how claims for punitive damages in such a multiplicity of actions throughout the
nation can be administered [so] as to avoid overkill").
32. See Georgia v. Mosely, 436 S.E.2d 635 (Ga. 1993) (upholding as constitu-
tional Georgia's legislative restriction of punitive awards to one case involving same
course of conduct, with 75% of such awards payable to state), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct.
2101 (1994). But see McBride v. General Motors Corp., 737 F. Supp. 1563 (M.D.
Ga. 1990) (reaching opposite result regarding constitutionality of Georgia statute).
Other cases dealing with the constitutionality of required payments of a part of a
punitive damage award to the state include: Gordon v. State, 608 So. 2d 800 (Fla.
1992) (constitutional), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1647 (1993) and Kirk v. Denver Pub-
lishing Co., 818 P.2d 262 (Colo. 1991) (unconstitutional); see also Sonja Larsen,
Annotation, Validity, Construction and Application of Statutes Requiring That Percentage
of Punitive Damages Awards Be Paid Directly to State or Court-Administered Fund, 16
A.L.R.5th 129 (1993). Where part of the award is paid to the state, however, an
Eighth Amendment problem may be involved. See Browning-Ferris Indus. of Ver-
mont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 270 (1989); McBride, 737 F. Supp.
at 1565.
The cases divide on the constitutionality of a cap on the amount of punitive
awards. See Hartsfield ex rel. Henderson v. Alabama Power Co., 627 So. 2d 878 (Ala.
1993) (unconstitutional); Garner v. Covington County, 624 So. 2d 1346 (Ala.
1993) (constitutional); see also Smith v. Printup, 866 P.2d 985 (Kan. 1993) (review-
ing cases regarding constitutionality of statutes requiring payment of part of puni-
tive award to state).
33. 718 F. Supp. 1233 (1989).
34. Id. at 1234-36; see Leonen v. Johns-Manville Corp., 717 F. Supp. 272
(D.N.J. 1989).
442 [Vol. 39: p. 433
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age awards can be imposed upon a defendant for the same course
of conduct in other jurisdictions, they would defeat the one-award
approach as well as unfairly disadvantage plaintiffs in the restrictive
jurisdiction. 35
III. CONTROLLING MULTIPLE PUNITIVE DAMAGE AWARDS
Although multiple punitive damage awards are not constitu-
tionally objectionable,3 6 defendants and commentators alike have
argued that multiple punitive damage awards result in excessive
punishment to the defendant and diminished compensation to fu-
ture plaintiffs. 3 7 Specifically, these advocates of limitations on puni-
tive damages assert that there is a point at which a defendant has
been punished sufficiently and that further imposition of punitive
damages only serves to cause the defendant's financial destruc-
tion.38 Moreover, it is argued that the imposition of excessive and
multiple punitive damage awards destroys a defendant's financial
ability to pay future compensatory and punitive damages to future
deserving plaintiffs; thus, depriving compensation to deserving vic-
tims for their injuries.3 9
However, the imposition of multiple punitive damage awards
in mass tort litigation is consistent with the purposes and policies
supporting the imposition of punitive damages. 40 Each claimant of
punitive damages has been separately injured.41 Thus, no one
claimant is more entitled to a punitive damage award than another
claimant.42 Moreover, the full egregiousness of a defendant's mis-
35. Juzwin, 718 F. Supp. at 1234-36.
36. See, e.g., Dunn v. HOVIC, 1 F.3d 1371 (3d Cir.), modified in part, 13 F.3d 58
(3d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp. v. Dunn, 114 S. Ct.
650 (1993); Johnson v. Celotex Corp., 899 F.2d 1281 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied,
498 U.S. 920 (1990); see also Simpson v. Pittsburgh Corning Corp., 901 F.2d 277
(2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 497 U.S. 1057 (1990); King v. Armstrong World Indus., 906
F.2d 1022 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 942 (1991); Man v. Raymark Indus.,
728 F. Supp. 1461, 1468 (D. Haw. 1989); Spaur v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp.,
510 N.W.2d 854, 866 (Iowa 1994). For a discussion of the constitutionality of multi-
ple punitive damage awards, see supra notes 7-10 and accompanying text.
37. See HERBERT B. NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLAss ACTIONS § 17.34 (3d ed.
1985).
38. Id.
39. Id. However, there are strong arguments in opposition to this claim. For
a discussion of the arguments that favor the imposition of multiple punitive dam-
age awards, see infra notes 40-93 and accompanying text.
40. Among the policies and purposes of punitive damages are deterrence of
future like conduct by the defendant or others, and punishment for intentional or
reckless behavior. NEWBERG, supra note 37, § 17.26.
41. Man v. Raymark Indus., 728 F. Supp. 1461, 1466-68 (D. Haw. 1989).
42. Indeed, each claimant must prove his or her eligibility for punitive dam-
ages. NEWBERG, supra note 37, § 17.29. Generally, proving eligibility for punitive
1994] 443
11
Phillips: Multiple Punitive Damages Awards
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1994
VILLANOVA LAw REviEw
conduct may not be revealed in the first trial and the defendant's
continued misconduct subsequent to the first trial might never be
exposed.43 Thus, the imposition of an initial punitive damage
award may fall far short of the amount needed to sufficiently deter
or punish a defendant.
Given that mass tort litigation will continue to be a reality in
our legal system, there are several alternative methods currently
available to control and restrict the imposition of punitive damages
without undercutting the purposes and policies of such awards.
These alternatives include: (1) the class action; (2) bankruptcy; (3)
post-trial hearings and (4) bifurcated trials. Each of these will be
discussed in the following sections.
A. Class Actions
A particularly attractive device with which to handle multiple
punitive damage awards is the class action lawsuit authorized by
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (F.R.C.P.) 23. 44 If all punitive dam-
damages requires satisfaction of three threshold criteria: (1) punitive damages are
permissible, as a matter of law, under the cause of action asserted by the plaintiff;
(2) the plaintiff must demonstrate actual injury for which he or she is entitled to
compensatory damages; and (3) the plaintiff must prove that the defendant's con-
duct was intentional or reckless. Id. Moreover, even if a plaintiff satisfies these
requirements, he or she is not entitled to punitive damages as a matter of law. Id.
Rather, punitive damages may only be awarded at the discretion of the trier of fact.
Id.
43. Seltzer, supra note 7, at 61-63. By establishing representative parties
under F.R.C.P. 23, a class action lawsuit can effectively determine the rights of a
pool of claimants in a single proceeding. Seltzer, supra note 7, at 63. In theory,
"overkill" would be effectively avoided as all liability would be determined at this
point. Id. Therefore, a more equitable system of distribution would be provided
to all plaintiffs, rather than just the first few fortuitous plaintiffs. Id.
44. The pertinent portion of F.R.C.P. 23 provides:,
(a) Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a class
may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1)
the class is so numerous thatjoinder of all members is impracticable, (2)
there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or
defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses
of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately
protect the interests of the class.
(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a
class action if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in ad-
dition:
(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual
members of the class would create a risk of
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to in-
dividual members for the class which would establish incompati-
ble standards of conduct for the party opposing the class, or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of
the class which would as a practical matter be dispositive of the
interests of the other members not parties to the adjudications
[Vol. 39: p. 433
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age awards can be determined in a single proceeding, the appropri-
ate level of total punishment can be determined at this proceeding
and the sum representing that total can then be apportioned
among the various claimants. 45 Such a procedure addresses two
concerns: (1) that defendants are punished appropriately for their
behavior and (2) that all deserving injured plaintiffs are permitted
to recover punitive damages. Although the class action alternative
has acquired new advocates recently,46 it has not proven to be a
feasible means of controlling multiple punitive damage awards.
At the outset, it should be noted that F.R.C.P. 23 provides for
three different types of class actions.47 The first, a 23(b) (1)
"mandatory" class action, requires that the proponent demonstrate
that: (1) failure to maintain a class action presents a risk of "incon-
sistent or varying adjudications" that would create "incompatible
standards of conduct" for the defendant or (2) separate adjudica-
tions would either be dispositive of the interests of other members
of the class or impair the other members' ability to protect their
interests through adjudication. 48 The second, a 23(b) (2) class ac-
tion, requires that the form of relief requested be injunctive in na-
ture.49 The third, a 23(b) (3) "voluntary" class action, requires that
the proponent demonstrate that there are "questions of law or fact
common to the members of the class" and that "a class action is
or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their
interests; or
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on
grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropri-
ate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with re-
spect to the class as a whole; or
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to
the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting
only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other
available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the
controversy.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)-(b).
45. Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 839-40 n.l (2d Cir.
1967).
46. See In re A.H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d 709, 740 (4th Cir.) (concluding that
historical reasons for rejecting class action suits in mass tort litigation are currently
being rejected), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 959 (1989).
47. All class actions must meet the threshold requirements of F.R.C.P. 23(a);
impracticality ofjoinder, common questions of law or fact, typicality and adequacy
of representation. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a). For a concise summary of these threshold
requirements as they relate to mass tort litigation, see Irving R. M. Panzer &
Thomas E. Patton, 21 TORT AND INS. LJ. 560, 563-64 (1986).
48. FED. R. Crv. P. 23(b)(1). For the text of F.R.C.P. 23(b)(1), see supra note
44.
49. FED. R. Crv. P. 23(b)(2). For the text of F.R.C.P. 23(b)(2), see supra note
1994]
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superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudi-
cation of the controversy."50 Of these three alternatives, only the
first, the mandatory class action, provides a vehicle with which to
control multiple punitive damage awards.51
1. Obstacles to Maintaining a Mandatory Class Action
The 23(b) (1) mandatory class action, as noted above, can be
maintained only upon one of two alternative showings: (1) failure
to maintain a class action would result in the risk of inconsistent
adjudications52 or (2) failure to maintain a class action would sub-
stantially impair the ability of class members to protect their inter-
ests in subsequent adjudications against the same defendant.53
However, courts have been unwilling to certify mandatory classes
under either alternative for punitive damage purposes.
a. No Risk of Inconsistent Adjudications.
Early on in the mass tort litigation debate, courts took the posi-
tion that the mere fact that some plaintiffs may be successful in
their suits against a defendant while others may be unsuccessful,
did not rise to the level of "inconsistent adjudications" or "incom-
patible standards of conduct."54 Addressing this issue, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit concluded that "a
judgment that defendants were liable to one plaintiff would not re-
quire action inconsistent with a judgment that they were not liable
to another plaintiff. By paying the firstjudgment, defendants could
act consistently with both judgments."55 The United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit echoed this interpretation of F.R.C.P.
23(b) (1) (A) in In re Bendectin Products Liability Litigation.56 Thus, as
50. FED, R. Crv. P. 23(b)(3). For the text of F.R.C.P. 23(b)(3), see supra note
44.
51. A 23(b) (2) class action is not available in most mass tort litigations, be-
cause the relief sought is not injunctive in nature. FED. R. Crv. P. 23(b) (2). In
addition, a voluntary class action, which permits plaintiffs to "opt out" and bring
their own action against a defendant is considerably less efficient at achieving the
desired effect of limiting the number of punitive damage awards. See Panzer &
Patton, supra note 47, at 566. Although a voluntary class action may have the effect
of reducing the number of punitive damage awards, it is a far less efficient method
than the mandatory class action which, in theory, permits only one punitive dam-
age award to be imposed on a defendant. Id.
52. FED. R. Crv. P. 23(b) (1) (A).
53. Id. 23(b) (1) (B).
54. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. United States Dist. Court for the Cent. Dist.
of Cal., 523 F.2d 1083, 1086 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 911 (1976).
55. Id.
56. 749 F.2d 300, 304 (6th Cir. 1984).
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a practical matter, F.R.C.P. 23(b) (1) (A) is not a viable option for
class certification of mass tort litigation. There is, however, a grow-
ing sentiment among commentators that F.R.C.P. 23(b) (1) (A)
should be available to certify class actions in mass tort litigation.57
b. The "Substantial Impairment" Standard: The Limited Fund
Argument.
Proponents of mandatory class actions for mass tort litigation
assert that the F.R.C.P. 23(b) (1) (B) "substantial impairment" re-
quirement is met by virtue of the fact that one defendant has a
finite source of money from which to pay all punitive damage
awards. Additionally, prior punitive damage awards may deplete
this fund and, thus, deprive subsequent successful plaintiffs from
recovering any punitive damages. 58 This theory, known as the "lim-
ited fund" theory, has proven unsuccessful in actual cases, but it has
not yet been definitively rejected.
In In re Northern District of California, Dalkon Shield IUD Products
Liability Litigation,59 the Ninth Circuit vacated the district court's
certification of a mandatory class based on the limited fund the-
ory.60 The Ninth Circuit concluded that mandatory class certifica-
tion under F.R.C.P. 23(b) (1) (B) was only appropriate "when
separate punitive damage claims necessarily [would] affect later
claims."61 Moreover, the Ninth Circuit concluded that even if there
was a sufficient showing that separate punitive damage claims
would necessarily affect later claims, there still must be a prelimi-
nary fact-finding inquiry as to the defendant's "assets, insurance,
settlement experience and continuing exposure" before there
could be a determination that there is a limited fund.62 Similarly,
57. Irving R. M. Panzer and Thomas E. Patton argue:
[W] hy should the defendant have the chance to relitigate over and over
again the same issue as to which it has already been found liable? By the
same token, why should plaintiffs be allowed to relitigate a finding of
nonliability? Is it not an "incompatible standard" for a manufacturer...
to be held responsible for its wrongdoing in one case, but in another to
be held not culpable?
Panzer & Patton, supra note 47, at 568-69; see also In reA.H. Robbins Co., 880 F.2d
709, 740 (4th. Cir.) (concluding that current trend is towards permitting class cer-
tification in mass tort litigation), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 959 (1989).
58. See In re Bendectin, 749 F.2d at 305 (noting that in ordering mandatory
class certification, district court relied on limited funds available to pay all punitive
damage awards); In re Northern Dist. of Cal., Dalkon Shield IUD Prods. Liab. Li-
tig., 693 F.2d 847, 851 (9th Cir. 1982) (same), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1171 (1983).
59. 693 F.2d 847 (1982).
60. Id. at 857.
61. Id. at 852 (emphasis added).
62. Id.
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in In re Bendectin, the Sixth Circuit vacated the district court's order
certifying a mandatory class based on the limited fund theory be-
cause the district court had failed to engage in the fact-finding re-
quired to support the existence of a limited fund.63 Therefore,
while the limited fund theory appears to be theoretically available
to proponents of a mandatory class action, it presents numerous
practical obstacles, including the degree and quantum of proof that
are necessary to support a finding of a limited fund.
B. Bankruptcy
Defendants in mass tort litigation may find bankruptcy a viable,
indeed attractive, method of coping with actual and potential multi-
ple punitive damage awards.64 Bankruptcy is an attractive mecha-
nism for defendants subject to multiple punitive damage awards for
two reasons. First, the bankruptcy court has the power to totally
eliminate a defendant's liability for punitive damage awards,
whether the liability has been reduced to a judgment or is only a
potential liability, pending the outcome of a currently filed case. 65
Second, federal bankruptcy law permits management to continue
to operate a company, insulated from plaintiffs' judgments, pend-
ing the approval of a successful reorganization plan.
66
1. The Procedural Benefits of Filing for Bankruptcy
Once a defendant in mass tort litigation files a Chapter 11
bankruptcy petition, two critical benefits result. First, Section
362 (a) of the Federal Bankruptcy Code provides for an automatic
stay of claims against the defendant. 67 The effect of this stay is to
halt the "commencement or continuation" of all proceedings
against the defendant.68 Second, the Federal Bankruptcy Code
provides a basis for certifying a mandatory class of mass tort plaintiffs
pursuant to F.R.C.P. 23(b) (1) (B). 69 The combined effect of the au-
tomatic stay provision and the mandatory class certification pro-
vides a defendant with an attractive forum within which to resolve
63. 749 F.2d 300, 306 (6th Cir. 1984).
64. See generally NEWBERG, supra note 37, § 20.01-.31.
65. For a discussion of the bankruptcy court's power to disallow punitive dam-
age claims, see infra notes 71-75 and accompanying text.
66. For a discussion of the flexibility and autonomy afforded the management
of a company in Chapter 11 bankruptcy, see infra notes 76-79 and accompanying
text.
67. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1988).
68. Id.
69. NEWBERO, supra note 37, § 20.07. For a discussion of mandatory class ac-
tions under F.R.C.P. 23(b) (1) (B), see supra notes 58-63 and accompanying text.
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mass tort claims; in short, a much more manageable litigation
situation.70
2. The Disallowance of Punitive Damages
In addition to the procedural benefits noted above, filing a
Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition may ultimately result in the elimi-
nation of all punitive damage claims against a defendant. Indeed,
this was the ultimate result in at least two Chapter 11 bankruptcy
cases filed because of mass tort litigation. 71
In In re A.H. Robins Co., 72 the bankruptcy court disallowed all
punitive damage claims against a dalkon shield manufacturer stem-
ming from product liability claims for injuries caused by the manu-
facturer's contraceptive device.73 The court concluded that Section
105(a) of the Federal Bankruptcy Code provided it with the equita-
ble powers to disallow and, therefore, eliminate liability for claims
for which the debtor-manufacturer would otherwise be liable.74
The court reasoned that A.H. Robins would be unable to success-
fully reorganize if it were subjected to potentially enormous and
unpredictable liability for punitive damages. 75 Thus, it appears that
Chapter 11 bankruptcy provides a mass tort litigation defendant
with a powerful tool to ward off punitive damage liability. More-
over, as discussed below, the bankruptcy alternative is no longer the
financial death knell to corporate defendants.
70. NEWBERG, supra note 37, § 20.07.
71. See In reA.H. Robins Co., 89 B.R. 555 (E.D. Va. 1988); In reJohns-Manville
Corp., 68 B.R. 618 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), aff'd, 78 B.R. 407 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), aff'd sub
nom. Kane v. Johns-Manville Corp., 843 F.2d 636 (2d Cir. 1988).
72. 89 B.R. 555 (E.D. Va. 1988).
73. Id. at 563. The result of this disallowance was the elimination of liability
for over seven million dollars of punitive damage claims pending on appeal in
numerous cases filed against A.H. Robins across the country. Id. at 558.
74. Id. at 561-62. Section 105(a) of the Bankruptcy Code provides:
The court may issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary
or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this tile. No provision of
this title providing for the raising of an issue by a party in interest shall be
construed to preclude the court from, sua sponte, taking any action or
making any determination necessary or appropriate to enforce or imple-
ment court orders or rules, or to prevent an abuse of process.
11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (1994).
75. A.H. Robins, 89 B.R. at 561-63. Judge Merhige stated that "[t]he presence
of a 'wild card' in the form of punitive damages would constitute the death knell of
any feasible reorganization plan." Id. at 562. But see RIcHARD B. SOBOL, BENDING
THE LAW: THE STORY OF THE DALKON SHIELD BANKRuPrcY 330-31 (1991) (asserting
that disallowance of all punitive damages was neither necessary nor equitable).
17
Phillips: Multiple Punitive Damages Awards
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1994
VILLANoVA LAW REVIEW
3. Bankruptcy As a Financial Management Tool-Not a Financial
Taboo
Bankruptcy is no longer a financial taboo. 76 This shift in per-
ception is largely a result of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978
that reformed the Federal Bankruptcy Code by creating the current
Chapter 11 reorganization provision. 77 Chapter 11 permits man-
agement to retain a significant amount of control over the day-to-
day operations of a company, even though the company is in bank-
ruptcy.78 As two commentators have observed:
[The] presumption favoring management's continued
control, when combined with other provisions of Chapter
11 affording the corporate debtor considerable latitude
regarding its treatment of creditors, effectively g[ives]
managers powerful incentives to pursue bankruptcy reor-
ganization. Managers are more likelyto keep theirjobs by
reorganizing rather than liquidating their firm, and dur-
ing reorganization they can operate without the con-
straints ordinarily imposed by creditors. 79
Thus, it appears that bankruptcy is a powerful, flexible and viable
coping mechanism for corporate defendants in mass tort litigation.
C. Post-Trial Hearings
The availability of a post-trial hearing may be a constitutionally
required mechanism to control the aggregate sum of punitive dam-
ages imposed upon a mass tort litigation defendant.8 0 During a
post-trial hearing, the defendant can introduce evidence in support
of the proposition that previously imposed punitive damage awards
mitigate or eliminate the justification for additional punitive dam-
age awards that may be imposed as a result of the current proceed-
ing. Such post-trial procedures may be established statutorily8 or
76. See Michael Bradley & Michael Rosenzweig, The Untenable Case for Chapter
11, 101 YALE L.J. 1043, 1047 n.20 (1992) (concluding that bankruptcy filing is re-
garded as management tool rather than "last gasp of a dying company").
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 1045.
80. See Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 20 (1991) (noting im-
portance of "meaningful and adequate review by the trial court whenever a jury
has fixed the punitive damages"). For a discussion of the constitutionally required
safeguards necessary to ensure reasonable punitive damage awards, see supra notes
1-6 and accompanying text.
81. See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 510.263(4) (Vernon 1952 & Supp. 1994). The
Missouri statute provides:
[Vol. 39: p. 433
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judicially.82
The scope and nature of the evidence that a defendant can
introduce at a post-trial hearing in support of mitigation of a cur-
rent punitive damage award have not been definitively decided. Ev-
idence of prior punitive damage awards actually paid by a
defendant for the same course of conduct is certainly relevant.83
The defendant's ability to pay future punitive damage awards based
on the same course of conduct is also important.8 4 With regard to a
defendant's ability to pay future punitive damage awards, courts
and commentators are in disagreement as to the quantum8 5 and
Within the time for filing a motion for new trial, a defendant may file
a post-trial motion requesting the amount awarded by the jury as punitive
damages be credited by the court with amounts previously paid by the
defendant for punitive damages arising out of the same conduct on
which the imposition of punitive damages is based. At any hearing, the
burden on all issues relating to such a credit shall be on the defendant
and either party may introduce relevant evidence on such motion. Such
a motion shall be determined by the trial court within the time and ac-
cording to procedures applicable to motions for a new trial. If the trial
court sustains such a motion the trial court shall credit the jury award of
punitive damages by the amount found by the trial court to have been
previously paid by the defendant arising out of the same conduct and
enter judgment accordingly. If the defendant fails to establish entitle-
ment to a credit under the provisions of this section, or the trial court
finds from the evidence that the defendant's conduct out of which the
prior punitive damages award arose was not the same conduct on which
the imposition of punitive damages is based in the pending action, or the
trial court finds the defendant unreasonably continued the conduct after
acquiring actual knowledge of the dangerous nature of such conduct, the
trial court shall disallow such credit, or, if the trial court finds that the
laws regarding punitive damages in the state in which the prior award of
punitive damages was entered substantially and materially deviate from
the law of the state of Missouri and that the nature of such deviation
provides good cause for disallowance of the credit based on the public
policy of Missouri, then the trial court may disallow all or any part of the
credit provided by this section.
Id. Such state legislative action has been criticized as "simply provid[ing] some
relief to out-of-state manufacturers at the expense of its own citizen-victims." Dunn
v. HOVIC, 1 F.3d 1371, 1386 (3d Cir.) (citing Enterprise Responsibility for Personal
Injury, II A.L.I. 261 (1991)), modified in part, 13 F.3d 58 (3d Cir.), cert. denied sub
nom. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Dunn, 114 S. Ct. 650 (1993).
82. See Dunn, 1 F.3d at 1384-89 (determining appropriateness of multiple pu-
nitive damage awards).
83. Id. at 1391; Spaur v. Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 510 N.W.2d 854, 868
(Iowa 1994).
84. Spaur, 510 N.W.2d at 868.
85. Cf Dunn, 1 F.3d at 1384 (concluding that evidence of negative net worth
alone does not constitute evidence sufficient to justify remittitur); Spaur, 510
N.W.2d at 867-68 (concluding that evidence of prior payments of three million
dollars in punitive damages and unspecified settlement amounts, coupled with de-
fendant's failure to demonstrate that currently imposed punitive damage award
would "threaten its corporate existence," failed to meet required level of proof to
support mitigation or remittitur).
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nature86 of evidence necessary to support mitigation of a punitive
damage award. Regardless of the quantum or nature of evidence
required to support remittitur of punitive damage awards, however,
the defendant will bear the burden of proof.
8 7
Even though there is no right to punitive damages, judges pre-
sumably cannot reduce such awards without conditioning a reduc-
tion on the right of a new trial at the option of a dissatisfied
plaintiff.88 This option preserves the plaintiff's right to ajury trial.
D. Bifurcated Trial
A number of jurisdictions provide for bifurcated trials. In a
bifurcated trial, if the jury finds liability for compensatory damages
in the first proceeding, it must then determine whether punitive
damages should be awarded in a second proceeding. 89 Such a bi-
furcated procedure permits a defendant to introduce evidence of
its wealth and of prior punitive damage awards imposed against it
during the second stage of the bifurcated proceeding. By permit-
ting such evidence in the second stage, the evidence will not have a
prejudicial effect on the finding of liability.9 0
A bifurcated proceeding, however, may not be available to
86. Courts are divided on the relevance of insurance coverage in assessing
punitive damages. Cf Lewis v. Terrebonne, 894 F.2d 142, 146 (5th Cir. 1990);
Michael v. Cole, 595 P.2d 995, 997 (Ariz. 1979). Courts and commentators are also
divided on the issue of whether the defendant's wealth is relevant as to punitive
damage awards. See Herman v. Sunshine Chem. Specialties, Inc., 627 A.2d 1081,
1086-87 (N.J. 1993) (compiling arguments on both sides).
87. Dunn, I F.3d at 1390.
88. SCHLUETER & REDDEN, supra note 1, §§ 3.4(A)-3.6(D) (1980). But see
Smith v. Printup, 866 P.2d 985 (Kan. 1993) (upholding constitutionality under
state and federal constitutions of statute that requires judge to determine amount
of awardable punitive damages after jury determines liability for such damages).
89. See Mo. ANN. STAT. § 510.263(1)-(3) (Vernon 1952 & Supp. 1994) (provid-
ing for bifurcation at request of any party of all actions involving punitive damages
tried before jury); Hodges v. S. C. Toof & Co., 833 S.W.2d 896 (Tenn. 1992); see
also CAL. CIv. CODE § 3295 (West Supp. 1994) (requiring bifurcation of trials); GA.
CODE ANN. § 105-2002.1(d) (Supp. 1993) (same); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 549.20(4)
(West Supp. 1994) (same); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-221(7) (1993) (same); NEv.
REv. STAT. § 42.005(3) (1993) (same); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-5(b) (West 1987)
(same); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-18-1(2) (1993) (same). In diversity cases brought
in federal court, F.R.C.P. 42(b) provides the trial court with discretion to bifurcate
the proceeding. FED. R. Civ. P. 42(b). It does not appear that bifurcation raises an
issue under the Erie doctrine. See Simpson v. Pittsburgh Corning Corp., 901 F.2d
277, 283 (2d Cir.) (asserting that bifurcation under F.R.C.P. 42(b) does not violate
Erie doctrine), cert. dismissed, 497 U.S. 1057 (1990).
90. See Simpson, 901 F.2d at 283 ("A defendant wishing to minimize the
amount of [punitive] damages by revealing the punitive damages assessed in prior
cases is understandably reluctant to put such evidence before the jury at the point
where it is deciding whether the defendant should be found liable at all.").
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every mass tort litigation defendant because the decision to bifur-
cate proceedings is generally left to the trial court's discretion. 91
Moreover, some mass tort litigation defendants may prefer not to
introduce evidence of wealth or prior punitive damage awards to a
jury at any stage of a proceeding because of the risk of undue preju-
dice. As a general proposition, therefore, a post-trial proceeding
before a judge may be the better alternative.
TV. CONCLUSION
There appears to be no punitive damages crisis in this country
and no constitutional problem.with such damages. Moreover, puni-
tive damage awards can serve an important function in the individu-
alized corrective justice for claimants. Insofar as a defendant feels
oppressed by multiple punitive damage awards arising out of the
same course of conduct, it always has the option of bankruptcy,
which is far from unattractive in the case of corporate defendants. 92
Short of bankruptcy, possible duplicative awards can be handled in
a post-trial proceeding before a judge by seeking a reduction in the
amount of the award.93
91. See id. (holding that denial of bifurcation under F.R.C.P. 42(b) is within
trial court's discretion);Johnson v. Celotex Corp., 899 F.2d 1281 (2d Cir.) (same),
cert. denied, 498 U.S. 920 (1990). But see Mo. ANN. STAT. § 510.263(1) (requiring
bifurcation if any party requests it).
92. For a discussion of punitive damages and the advantages of Chapter 11 of
the Bankruptcy Code, see supra notes 64-79 and accompanying text.
93. For a discussion of punitive damages and the advantages of a post-trial
hearing, see supra notes 80-88 and accompanying text.
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